Abstract: This study investigates the conditions under which pro-status quo groups increase their advocacy success during an entire policy-making process. It scrutinizes whether prostatus quo defenders who are involved in multiple institutional venues and who join many coalitions of interest groups are able to achieve their policy preferences. A case study focusing on the regulation of stem cell research in California traces the policy making-process and the related advocacy activities of interest groups in the legislative, administrative, judicial, and direct-democratic venues. The empirical results, which are based on a formal Social Network Analysis, reveal that very few groups are multi-venue players and members
This research design is innovative for four reasons. First, most studies ask groups to selfassess their typical patterns of strategy in policy de-contextualized surveys, even if there is an obvious need to link groups' strategies to a specific policy-making process (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 174; Baumgartner 2007: 487; Beyers 2008 Beyers : 1206 Beyers -1207 Halpin and Binderkrantz 2011: 207; Hojnacki et al. 2012) . Unlike these survey studies, the present study captures the observed lobbying strategies of groups in all the venues activated during an entire policymaking process.
Second, previous studies that have already adopted such a dynamic and policycontextualized approach concentrated on a limited number of venues (e.g. Holyoke 2003, Bouwen and McCown 2007 , Boehmke et al. 2013 , Binderkrantz et al. 2014 . No empirical study has yet considered simultaneously all four venues available to groups, namely Legislature, Administration, Courts and Direct Democracy. Some studies were dedicated to explaining how groups choose between two or three advocacy strategies in the United States (Grossmann 2012 , Hilson 2002 , Miller 2009 ) and in Europe (Binderkrantz 2005 , Halpin et al. 2012 , Perdersen et al. 2014 , Kriesi et al. 2007 ). The added value of this study is to take into account the direct democracy venue as one strategic option for groups. So far, this venue has been either ignored or, contrarily, was the only venue researched. (Boehmke 2005a , Gerber 1999 .
It is also important to investigate groups' activities in all possible venues, as most decisions taken in different venues are not independent from one another. Some venue changes are institutionally predetermined, such as the delegation of powers from the legislature to the administration or a bill ratification or veto by the Governor. When a venue change is the result of a pro-active strategy by policy entrepreneurs, the connection between decisions is also obvious: for instance, groups may contest the constitutionality of popular initiative (see Proposition 71 in the empirical case study presented below). In sum, interest groups use multiple venues to influence policy-making and a new venue might represent an opportunity for redress for a group that did not achieve its preference in the previous venue.
Groups might mobilize in some venues but not in others, and may achieve advocacy success in one venue before experiencing a setback elsewhere. The availability of multiple venues as a mechanism to counter undue influence is a foundational characteristic of the American political system, and to understand how this feature applies to status-quo defenders, it is critical to including all institutional venues.
Third, this article applies classical indicators of Social Network Analysis (SNA) to capture the relational profile and network positions of groups trying to influence binding policy decisions in several institutional venues and through coalitions. Previous SNA studies looking at the position that groups occupy within political networks active in one venue demonstrate that well-connected groups tend to display higher access to policy-makers (Beyers and Braun 2013) or even higher influence on policy outputs (Box-Steffensmeier 2014; Heaney and Lorenz 2013) . The added value of the present study is to apply the SNA approach across the entirety of the policy process.
In addition, existing SNA literature does not consider groups' advocacy goals. The fourth innovation is thus to combine the groups' network position with their strategy as defenders vs.
challengers of the policy status quo. Baumgartner et al. (2009: 241) argue that one of the most consistent findings throughout lobbying studies is that pro-status quo groups usually realize their preferences and get what they want, namely no substantial policy change. This study considers the advocates' position regarding the policy status quo as the main factor shaping advocacy strategy and success, in contrast to other studies exclusively focusing on group's interest, resources or policy positions without regard to the policy status quo. 6 The next section reviews the relevant literature on advocacy success as it relates to the status quo, and concludes by formulating five theoretical expectations. The description of the main variables, measurements and data sources for the empirical analysis follows. Then, we present the empirical results in two steps: descriptive statistics and regression analyses. After summarizing the main findings, the concluding section puts them into perspective.
Theoretical framework
The striking resilience of policy status quo has been highlighted by many studies on interest groups lobbying. We capitalize on this robust finding, but specify the conditions under which status quo defenders are able to avoid major "policy punctuations". In particular, we expect that the number of venues in which pro-status quo groups are active, the number of coalitions they build or join, their resource endowment and their advocacy experience contribute to the success of their policy influence strategies, and this throughout the many decisions that shape the policy process.
The power of status quo
In their seminal study of lobbying in the US congress, Baumgartner et al. (2009: 247-250) claim that defenders of the status quo enjoy a tremendous advantage in policy-making processes. Advocates of substantial policy change frequently face the major problem of not attracting sufficient attention from political decisions-makers. To get on the political agenda, status quo challengers must expand the level of issue saliency and the scope of conflict. By contrast, the pro-status quo groups may be less active and strategically raise doubts about the feasibility and the costs of the proposed policy change. Further reasons for status quo bias include the difficulty of building a large (bipartisan) majority to support a substantial policy change and convincing the gatekeepers of existing programs that revising "their" programs is necessary. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is that groups defending the status quo have a higher probability of advocacy success (hypothesis 1). Our goal here is to specify this general expectation by looking at the conditions under which a group defending the status quo may increase its policy success. Therefore, we simultaneously consider the network positions of pro status quo groups, and also the resources and advocacy experience of all groups defending or challenging the status quo.
Network position: multi-venue and team players
Recent studies relying on a formal Social Network Analysis concluded that the relational profile of interest groups and their embeddedness in networks matter considerably for their access to venues and, eventually, for policy influence. Groups which collaborate with other well-connected groups, and have developed a strategic "coalition portfolio" (Heaney and
Lorenz 2013:253) increase their policy influence during policy formulation, implementation or litigation processes (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2013) . The network position of a group is as important as its internal resources (e.g. members and staff) to explain venue access (Beyers and Braun 2013) . This empirical finding holds in very different political systems and policy domains.
These SNA findings let us assume that actors who benefit from their relational profile or their network position are able to increase their advantage by adopting a pro-status quo perspective (Baumgartner et al. 2009 ). Consequently, our second and third hypotheses are that the likelihood of realizing a preferred policy outcome (i.e. advocacy success) is higher for pro-status quo groups mobilizing in several institutional venues (i.e. multi-venue players) (hypothesis 2), and for pro-status quo groups joining several coalitions (i.e. team players) (hypothesis 3). In addition to the supportive empirical evidence provided by previous SNA studies ( Varone et al. 2016) , several arguments underlie these theoretical hypotheses.
"Multi-venue players" are groups that mobilize to influence several binding decisions in different venues. It has been confirmed that "repeat players" have a larger policy influence than "one-shotters" (Galanter 1974) . For example if a group wins a case within the judicial venue (Galanter 1974 , Hansford 2004 , it rapidly brings a subsequent suit in court to "lock-in" the earlier (favorable) court ruling by having it applied as precedent in later (positive) court decisions. Past success thus explains the ex post (successful) use of a litigation strategy and, eventually, the consolidation of the policy status quo. We assume here that a similar lock-in strategy is probably also at work across venues. In order to solidify the substantive content of the policy and to avoid a substantial policy revision, pro-status quo groups stay mobilized and act as multi-venue players. Groups want to translate a legislative victory into favorable rulemaking outputs in the executive venue. Or the winners of a direct democracy ballot (i.e.
legislative or constitutional initiative) want to prevent their opponents from "stealing" their initiative through a judicial review process (Miller 2009) or during the rule-making and implementation process (Gerber et al. 2001) . Such lock-in strategy is particularly important for groups defending the status quo (Baumgartner et al. 2009:232ff) .
Finally, the membership strategy of groups might also be a strong impetus for advocating through the entire policy-making process. venues. This key position should eventually also translate into high advocacy success.
Resources and experience count
To account for the postulated dominance of business groups in policy advocacy (i.e. the famous "upper-class accent" in the pluralist heavenly chorus according to Schattschneider 1960:34-35), we also conceptually and later empirically distinguish between group types. The conventional wisdom is that one should expect a higher success rate for business and occupational groups than for public interest, religious or others groups (identity, institutional, etc.), because business and occupational groups presumably have more financial and personnel resources and specific, material, and short-term oriented interests to promote. In addition, corporate institutions have more managerial latitude than membership groups to make strategic decisions about resources allocation and advocacy activities (Salisbury 1984:68) . Nevertheless, Baumgartner et al. (2009: 203, 212-213 and 225-236) ) found no direct, positive, and strong link between a group's resources and its policy success. The main reason for this low correlation has to do with competition between individual groups and/or policy sides with roughly similar resources. In a follow-up study, McKay (2012:913) similarly concluded that "greater financial variables do not appear to help lobbyists' chances of achieving their objectives or attaining their preferred policy outcome".
However, these studies tested the "resources count" argument only in one single venue. As we consider here an entire decision-making process, it is plausible that financial and personnel resources become more important for groups that are active in many venues.
Multi-venue players probably need more financial resources to hire lobbyists, to fund political action committees and to contribute to campaigning coalitions. Political staff with a legal and technical expertise is also required for writing an amicus curiae brief or for delivering credible comments to rules proposed by a regulatory agency. Despite the rather ambivalent findings of previous research, we expect here that groups with more resources (i.e. business and occupational groups) have a higher advocacy success (hypothesis 4).
In a similar vein, our last hypothesis stipulates that the likelihood of realizing one's preferred policy outcome is higher for groups with more advocacy experience (hypothesis 5).
Over the years and after being involved in various policy processes, an organization learns how to better advocate towards its policy goals, in which venue to mobilize and which winning coalitions to join to be associated with this success (Gray and Lowery, 1998: 14) .
Groups with advocacy experience know that affiliation in some venues makes it easier to enter in other venues as recognized "interested parties". In California, administrative decisions are subject to judicial review, and a group may elect to lobby an agency in anticipation of future legal dispute. Similarly, in the same (judicial) venue, a group might file a suit to ensure standing as the cases moves to the appellate level. In sum, groups with more advocacy experience are more frequently repeat and multi-venue players and, according to our first hypothesis, have a higher advocacy success. 
**Put

Regulating research on stem cells: venues and decisions
Research on human embryonic stem cells (hESC) intends to develop therapies to treat degenerative pathologies such as cancer, Parkinson's and Alzheimer's diseases. The problem is that the destruction of embryos to derive hESC is a very sensitive political issue. The political debate over the regulation of hESC research has been very controversial at both the federal and state levels. We focus on California policy concerning hESC research. property and revenue-sharing requirements for non-profits and for-profit grantees.
**Put Table 2(Venues and binding decisions concerning hESC research) here**
Variables and measurements
Advocacy success constitutes the dependent variable of this study and is measured through the realization of a group's policy preference (McKay 2012) . One key advantage of focusing on the "preferred outcome" variable is that it is based on behavioral data that can be observed in different venues. For instance, for each decision taken in the legislative venue, this variable can be conceived as a dichotomous measure of whether or not a bill actively supported by a group succeeded in becoming a law. If a group lobbied on more than one decision, we sum the measures of preference attainment for each decision and divide the result by the number of decisions on which the group advocated, to obtain an interval variable. Within the direct democracy venue, one can assess whether the ballot proposition supported by a group is eventually accepted by the voters. In the judicial venue, the court's decision also constitutes a binary measure of advocacy success, depending on whether the ruling is for or against the group's position. Similar to the legislative venue, the variable at the judicial venue level is weighted by the number of mobilizations and measured as an interval. In the administrative venue, we assess whether a rule-making agency modifies the rule according to the changes proposed by a group, and we obtain an interval measure of advocacy success depending on how many modifications were requested, and how many were actually modified in the final rules. We then aggregate the overall measure of advocacy success as an interval variable, summing the venue-specific measures and weighting it by the number of venues where the group mobilized. Such a qualitative-objective variable partially relates to important studies focusing on lobbyists' policy preferences and success (Bernhagen et al. 2014 ). was not otherwise available. For "business and occupational groups", two coauthors classified all groups in predefined categories (business, occupational associations, unions, public interest groups, etc.) using a double-blind process.
Empirical Results
The empirical findings are presented in two steps. First, descriptive statistics depict the level of mobilization across venues and of coalition membership of groups participating in the policy process. Second, regression analyses show that occupying a central network position is not sufficient for the pro-status groups to improve their advocacy success.
Where and with whom do groups mobilize?
As a starting point, Unsurprisingly, the policy issue at stake directly affects their core business (i.e. research centers). They thus belong to the dominant category of groups mobilized during the whole policy-making process. Finally, all groups are in favor of the development of hESC research.
This means that they defend the status quo in ten out of the eleven decisions, as only the first law (S.B. 253) introduced a substantial policy change by allowing for the first time the research on hESC. The groups opposed to the development of hESC research (i.e. religious groups) did not mobilize in many venues or join many coalitions. Moving one step further, the next section presents the empirical test of the theoretical hypotheses.
Are pro-status quo groups occupying a central network position more successful?
To investigate the extent to which pro-status quo groups, which are multi-venue and team players, might enjoy higher advocacy success, we conduct a multiple regression analysis. This is a common approach to investigate predictors at the actor level and to explain attributes of an actor at the interval level (such as "preferred outcome"). To ensure that the dependent variable is independently identically distributed, we applied the OLS regression analysis on UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002; v.6 .582, see also Borgatti et al. 2013) , which integrates a random permutations method for constructing sampling distributions of R-squared and slope coefficients iii . The model's main variables were already depicted in Table 3 . However, one point should be highlighted: the variable "multi-venue player" was operationalized through the nBetweenness score of a group in the decision network (i.e. the number of times a group lies on the geodesic path between two binding decisions). This theoretical choice is strongly supported by the empirical data. The match between a high nBetweenness score and a high multi-venue mobilization is almost perfect. In other words, the nBetweenness centrality is indeed a valid indicator for groups' activities across different venues.
Our model estimates if the likelihood of advocacy success is higher for groups that are defenders of the policy status quo, central in the decisions' network, or in the coalitions' network. We consider these strategies individually and include an interaction term for the groups that participate in pro-status quo decisions or in pro-status quo coalitions' networks.
We also test whether groups with more advocacy experience (proxied by organizational age) and resources (type business or occupational) enjoy a higher rate of success in addition to their selected strategy. There are no problems of collinearity between these variables (see Table 8 in Appendix).
Results show that empirics fully support the general expectation of increased advocacy success for the pro-status quo groups (Baumgartner et al. 2009 ), as stated in our first hypothesis. The pro-status quo coefficient is positive (0.517) and significant (at p ≤ 0.01) iv even when controlling for network position, age and resources, as shown in Table 6 (see also
Model 5 in Table 7 , Appendix). By contrast, the results show that neither being active in many venues nor participating in many coalitions impact advocacy success, with the coefficient on these variables failing to return statistical significance (see also Models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 7 , Appendix). When integrating pro-status quo preferences, being a multivenue player (nBetweenness decisions) might even negatively affect one's advocacy success.
However, pro-status quo groups do not seem to be unduly affected by this effect, but seem to suffer when participating in many coalitions (see the interaction effects). But those results have to be treated with caution, as the interactions terms taking into account the multi-venue mobilization (hypothesis 2) and coalition membership (hypothesis 3) of pro-status-quo groups also return non-significant results. Our second and third hypothesis are therefore left unverified.
Additionally, we also control for the causal effect between business and occupational groups, and the presumed availability of financial resources and professionalization for engaging in advocacy activities, and advocacy success (hypothesis 4). The coefficient for the "IG Business" variable is positive (0.043) but hardly significant (at p ≤ 0.1). The intensity of mobilization, and therefore resource advantage of business groups is observed in the direct democracy (i.e. the coalition supporting Proposition 71 raised almost $25 million, 37 times more than its opponents) and administrative venues (i.e. technical expertise and staff for monitoring and commenting on rulemaking by the CIRM), but not in the legislative and judicial venues. Thus we find some indications that business and occupational groups can translate their (postulated) resource advantage into a higher advocacy success rate, compared to other group types. Finally we examine how advocacy experience (proxied by organizational age) might enhance the advantages of groups, and find lack of support for our fifth hypothesis. Advocacy experience does not seem to generate benefits for interest groups. Table 6 (Regression analysis) here** All in all, the empirical results yield mixed evidence with respect to our five specific theoretical hypotheses. On one hand, this study confirms once again the endurance of the policy status quo, using a process-tracing methodology that accounts for the path of the policy process across all available institutional venues. Defenders of the policy status quo display higher levels of advocacy success than challengers proposing a substantial policy change. On the other hand, pro-status quo groups mobilizing in many venues do not systematically outperform status-quo defenders advocating in only one venue, and pro-status quo groups that are team players do not experience additional success compared to status quo defenders working alone. In fact, we were unable to identify the effect of advocating in multiple venues or in several coalitions on lobbying success, for groups supporting or changing the status quo.
**Put
Additionally, and in line with the ambivalent results of previous studies, it appears that groups defending business interests take only a slight advantage of their resources to better realize their policy preferences. Finally, advocacy experience does not appear to affect preference attainment.
Conclusions
The major aim of this study was to identify under which conditions a pro-status quo interest group can realize its preferred policy outcome. To answer this question, we developed an innovative framework and methodology, by placing groups' advocacy activities in their policy context. The collected behavioral data captures a diverse set of groups in all institutional venues activated during an entire policy-making process. The theoretical approach is therefore ambitious in comparison to previous studies focusing either on lobbying (the legislature or the administration), litigation or direct democracy campaigning.
Furthermore, this study applied tools of Social Network Analysis (SNA) to capture groups' embeddedness in multi-venue involvement and coalition networks. This allowed for a straightforward link between the level of advocacy activities across the policy process, the group's position in the policy network and toward the policy at stake (i.e. status quo defenders vs. challengers), and finally advocacy success.
The empirical results first and foremost support prior findings regarding a pro-status quo advantage, which can now be extended through time and the path of a policy debate across several institutional venues. In contrast, this study reveals that multi-venue and team players do not display higher advocacy success than groups lobbying in one venue and alone, whether or not they are defending the status quo. In SNA jargon, actors with high nBetweenness or nDegree centralities and opposing a policy change are not the most successful. This finding is not in line with previous (SNA) literature on interest groups. By contrast, being a business or occupational group with a supposedly large resource endowment increases the chances of realizing one's preferred policy outcome. The fact that business groups' advocacy activities payoff is contrary to findings of previous studies (Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay 2012) which found that the resources and membership size of a group have no significant correlation with its ability to realize its preferred outcome. However, resources endowment is not a very strong predictor for advocacy success in our models. This does not mean that resources do not matter at all, but that the impacts of resources is limited by the type of issue at stake, the heterogeneity of actors' coalition and the counter-mobilization by opponents that are also well-endowed with a financial budget, a large membership and qualified staff, or by the particular characteristics of the institutional venue.
More striking in our results are the very small number of multi-venue players and the missing link between multi-venue involvement and advocacy success. This puzzling result shall be further investigated with a process-tracing approach. Such an approach should consider interdependencies between decisions, venues, and the related path-dependent group behavior. Simply put, a group might lobby in one venue due to past (or desired future) involvement in another. For example, as discussed earlier, a group might mobilize in rulemaking to preserve its right of appeal in the judicial venue. If confirmed, such finding would contribute to explain why multi-venue involvement does not translate into higher advocacy success.
Furthermore, the present study has several limitations and opens the path to new (SNA) studies on interest groups. First, the realization of the group's "preferred outcome" was measured empirically as a very rough proximate for capturing the (perceived) advocacy success (Bernhagen et al. 2014) . Nevertheless, the "preferred outcome" variable goes one step further than the dependent variables used previously by Beyers and Braun (2013) Fourth, the reasons behind the prevalence of advocacy success for status-quo defendants warrants further investigation, particularly because the data for this analysis illustrates a bias in preference attainment, but not necessarily in policy influence. In other words, by using preference attainment we remain a few causal steps away from showing that these groups are actually successful in impacting policy change, and it may be that the institutional design through which a new policy must emerge is so advantageous to the status quo that the groups defending it appear more successful in their advocacy strategies.
We conclude that one major added value of this study was (1) to extend the analysis and to take four institutional venues of the policy process into account; (2) to go one step further, not only investigating access to decision-makers, but also advocacy success as dependent variable; and (3) to combine classical variables of the interest groups literature (such as position vis-à-vis policy status quo, organizational age and resources) with SNA measures of the network position of groups. To gain "the full picture" of advocacy strategies and success, it would however be worth triangulating this approach with a survey-based and multi-actors analysis. Finally, one promising future research path is the in-depth analysis of the causal links between a group's network position, the success of its advocacy activities and, eventually, its policy influence. The integration of the last element of this chain (i.e.
influence on policy process and outputs), together with the inclusion of political parties, bureaucrats, judges etc. could probably help us resolve the puzzle of multi-venue and multicoalition involvement that we uncovered here. Legislature: 1 for groups using the same lobbying firm during the legislative year of the decision as at least one other group, 0 for a group mobilizing alone. For all venues: the age in years of the organization on the date of the last decision of the policy process 1 We capped the measures of coalition membership to 1 if the group participated in more than one coalition per decision; or sent more than 1 letter of comments per round in rule-making proceedings. Note: Levels of statistical significance: º p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
As not for all 152 groups previously included in the descriptive statistics, the variable age could be investigated, the number of groups included for this analysis is 138. iii "In a first step, it performs standard regression across corresponding cells of the dependent and independent vectors. In a second step, it randomly permutes the elements of the dependent vector and re-computes the regression storing resultant values of r-square and all coefficients. This step is repeated a thousand times." (see UCINET help file on http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/423udi3; see also Borgatti et al. 2002) .
iv Note that regression models were also calculated for a binary dependent variable of preference realization. The binomial logit regression was run with "tnam" in the "xergm" package on R (Leifeld et al. 2015) . If the operationalization of the dependent variable as binary data is not coming as close to the reality as the interval, results (not displayed here) also strongly confirm a significant tendency of pro-status quo positions having an impact on advocacy success.
